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Introduction
How does the reform of state institutions shape prospects for peace after armed conflict?
This question has been central to the academic literature on post-conflict peace processes and of great interest to practitioners promoting peace in war-torn states. For instance, in 2012 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) allocated more than USD 17 billion in development assistance to support governance and peace in developing countries -the highest amount of aid provided to any sector that year (OECD 2014) . Nevertheless, research analysing institutional reform processes has to date suffered from an insufficient conceptual approach to the relationship between such reforms and peace. Most notably, the Julia Strasheim: The Politics of Institutional Reform and Post-Conflict Violence in Nepal 5 296/2017 GIGA Working Papers scholarship focuses on how institutional designs, as the outcomes of reform processes, reduce post-conflict violence and help promote peace. This means that the debate is dominated by studies analysing how, for instance, federalist state structures (Hartzell et al. 2001) , electoral system designs (Boogards 2013) , or power-sharing deals (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) promote peace after war. The literature therefore does not adequately address how the politics characterising reform processes affect the legitimacy of institutional outcomes and, ultimately, whether or not violent protest against these institutions takes place.
This paper complements the literature and analyses how rather than institutional designs alone, emotional rhetoric, backtracking on previous commitments, the dominance of elite political actors in decision-making, the acceleration of reform processes, and the embedding of single reforms into a "concert" of institutional reforms (Kurtenbach and Mehler 2013) which, as a whole, sparks fears of discrimination are factors that can exacerbate tensions and spark violence. To this end, the paper takes on the case of Nepal. Nepal's peace process is often re- To what extent did the politics of Nepal's institutional reform process contribute to the violent escalation of grievances in the Tarai? By analysing this question, the paper makes important contributions to the research on the institutional causes of peace, as well as to the The paper is divided into four sections. In Section 2, I discuss existing research on the relationship between institutional reforms and post-conflict peace. This serves to develop an argument for why it is theoretically and empirically rewarding to shift the analytical focus from the outcome to the politics of institutional reform processes. In the subsequent section I briefly outline Nepal's conflict and post-conflict periods in order to introduce the relevant political actors and to describe the patterns of violence that erupted following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. Section 4 provides a critical assessment of how the politics of institutional reform increased minority group grievances and added to the violent escalation of such grievances from mid-2015 onwards. In my concluding remarks, I suggest avenues for future research.
Institutional Reform in Post-Conflict Societies
A growing number of studies today regard the reform of state institutions in the aftermath of armed conflict as being of paramount importance for promoting sustainable peace and democracy (Ansorg and Kurtenbach 2017; Paris and Sisk 2009; Wolff 2011) . If conflict occurs because identity groups violently rebel to address their political or economic exclusion, then reforming state institutions so that post-conflict politics are more inclusive or democratic should have a pacifying effect. Reforms to promote non-violent, institutional conflict management can thus include the redesign of territorial state structures (Brancati 2006) , the reform of electoral or party systems (Boogards 2013; Reilly 2006) , or the engineering of institutions in the state security sector (Bryden and Hänggi 2004) . The literature on such reforms has in recent years particularly accentuated three aspects of reform processes.
Firstly, the debate has highlighted the dilemmas encountered by actors promoting institutional reforms in war-to-peace and war-to-democracy transitions, meaning how reforms that 7 296/2017 GIGA Working Papers aim to support post-conflict peace are not necessarily the best choice for furthering democracy at the same time (Jarstad and Sisk 2008) . This discussion links to the broader research within the political science literature on the conflicting relationships between democracy, democratisation, institutional inconsistency, and peace (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Vreeland 2008) .
In particular, studies have pointed out that while power-sharing institutions are meaningful drivers of peace after war as they reduce the warring parties' uncertainties over political survival (Mattes and Savun 2009), power-sharing deals can be profoundly undemocratic (but see Hartzell and Hoddie 2015) . This is because institutional guarantees for inclusion in decision-making contradict the uncertain, competitive nature of democracies (Roeder and Rothchild 2005) and entrench existing identity group cleavages (Schneckener 2002) .
Secondly, the debate has overwhelmingly focused on explaining how specific institutional arrangements foster peace. This has notably concerned the aforementioned effects of political, military, territorial, or economic power-sharing institutions (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) .
Empirically, this relationship has predominantly been assessed in statistical analyses and has focused almost exclusively on how power-sharing reduces the risk of recurring armed conflict, rather than on how institutions of joint rule curb other types of post-conflict violence (Cammett and Malesky 2012; Mattes and Savun 2009) . While these studies report ambiguous findings on the pacifying effects of political power-sharing (cf. Binningsbø 2013), there is more profound correlative empirical evidence for the peace-conduciveness of territorial and military power-sharing (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008) . The statistical debate is complemented by a substantial body of case studies on power-sharing, primarily on Africa, that are substantively more critical of how joint rule reduces the risk of violence (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Lemarchand 2007; Simons et al. 2013 ). Tull and Mehler (2005) , for instance, hold that powersharing promotes renewed war as it rewards the use of violence with a seat in office. The pacifying effect of power-sharing is further questioned by integrationist approaches to institutional reform that suggest designing institutions so that they do not build on, but rather reduce the salience of identity group cleavages (cf. Horowitz 1993; Reilly 2001) .
Thirdly, the academic debate also tends to focus on studying reform processes supported by the international community (Jung 2012; Peou 2007; Zürcher et al. 2013) . Empirically, this discussion has again been primarily driven by case studies on African peace processes -such as Liberia (e.g. Bøås and Stig 2010) -but has also included studies of institutional reforms in south-eastern Europe (Bernabéu 2007; Narten 2008) . Afghanistan and Iraq are further prominent cases for (the limits of) internationally driven reforms (Reynolds 2006; Waldner 2009) . A key focus of these studies is their critique of how exporting Western ideas of institutional designs to the developing world and imagining the Westphalian state as an end product of this process is unfit for promoting peace or democracy after war. This is not least because following blueprints and best practice guidelines fails to more clearly take into account the underlying context conditions (Ansorg and Kurtenbach 2017) . Situated within this literature, this paper suggests a different approach to studying postconflict institutional reform. Firstly, it argues that by concentrating on institutional designs as causes of peace, the debate uses a limited conceptual understanding of how reform processes promote or impede peace after war. This is because such a focus -likely driven by the dominance of statistical analyses in the debate and the availability of quantitative indicators to measure institutional designs -overlooks other factors of a reform process that affect its legitimacy and thus also violent protest. In the worst case, an analytical focus only on institutional designs as the "end product" of reform processes risks omitting key variables or mechanisms that help illuminate how institutional reforms reduce post-conflict violence and contribute to peace. Secondly, the paper holds that by concentrating on reforms driven by international actors, the literature risks overlooking the domestic power politics at play when third parties are absent.
In the following assessment of how institutional reforms contributed to the recent violent escalation of minority protests in Nepal, I therefore focus on two aspects of the domestic politics of institutional reform: actors and modalities. Firstly, and borrowing from scholarship on civil society engagement in peace negotiations and peacebuilding, it is reasonable to expect that the legitimacy of post-conflict institutions depends on the political and social actors granted decision-making authority in reform processes (Nilsson 2012; Paffenholz 2010; Zanker 2014 ).
This means that more inclusive institutional reform processes that not only protect the interests of elite political players in the post-conflict state -such as those of warring-party representatives -but also more broadly integrate the voices and concerns of other parts of society result in more broadly legitimated institutions and thus also lower the risk of violence motivated by grievances over institutional designs. This seems like a straightforward approach to how reforms shape prospects for peace, but Svensson (2014) has pointed out that the debate has given scant attention to actors other than the warring parties or their international custodians. Beyond civil society groups, these particularly include non-militant political parties without a history of armed insurgency (cf. Brosché and Höglund 2016) .
Secondly, modalities point to the manner in which political and social actors implement and communicate their decisions on institutional reform. Past research in this regard has particularly suggested that the way political elites embed single institutional reforms in broader reform processes shapes the legitimacy of institutional outcomes. For instance, institutional reforms embedded in reform processes that as a whole alleviate rather than increase any fears of marginalisation should curb violence in the post-conflict period. Kurtenbach and Mehler (2013: 2) refer to this joint effect as the "concert of institutions" and argue that institutions and their reform do not exist in a vacuum, but interact with and are conditioned by the underlying context conditions of post-conflict societies as well as by the numerous other reforms taking place (cf. Basedau 2017 ). An example of this interaction is the link between power-sharing institutions and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) processes. While being subjected to DDR may raise fears of vulnerability for warring parties, this 9 296/2017 GIGA Working Papers is alleviated by offering party representatives positions in power-sharing institutions. In Liberia, for instance, party representatives "blocked disarmament until they received more government jobs" (Papagianni 2008: 46) . The debate on post-conflict institutional reform has so far granted little attention to such interactions (Ansorg et al. 2013 ).
Armed Conflict and Post-Conflict Violence in Nepal
The Nepalese state and its institutions have long exhibited profound discrimination against 
The Politics of Institutional Reform in Nepal
Madhesis and Tharus have voiced grievances with regard to four constitutional provisions.
Firstly, they believe that a system of geography-based federalism (as detailed in Article 56.3 of the constitution) will result in their further marginalisation -for instance, because the proposed delineation of federal units would mean they would not constitute a majority in 2 Author interview with an NC Central Committee member, Kathmandu, 19 October 2015.
3 Author interview with a civil society leader and election observer, Lalitpur, 9 October 2015.
296/2017 GIGA Working Papers any of the units (cf. Sanchez Palacio 2015). Secondly, they hold that the constitution (particularly Article 11) incorporates a citizenship law that hurts the rights of both women and Madhesis (see below). Thirdly, they argue that the constitution also introduces an electoral law, in Article 84.1a, that drops previous legislation on proportional representation (PR) and leaves Madhesis and Tharus under-represented in the national parliament. 4 Fourthly, they demand population-based electoral constituencies, instead of constituencies based on geography and population as also enshrined in Article 84.1a. While these demands all clearly relate to institutional designs and the outcomes of the constitution-making process, the violence that ensued as the result of minority grievances cannot be understood based on these outcomes alone.
Actors: Traditional Elites vs. Marginalised Communities
First and foremost, the violence in the Tarai is the result of the protestors' perception that the constitution-making process and the institutional reforms it proposed were squarely dominated by elite politicians in Kathmandu and meant to serve their interests, while Nepal's marginalised groups were not invited to take part in decision-making. This is a somewhat controversial claim, as Nepal's constitutional process has in the past often been hailed as While some have argued that there "are so many cultures, ethnicities, and political ideologies in Nepal that any expectations of consensus in the constitution-making process are misguided and naïve" (Williams 2015: 251) , for the marginalised groups in the Tarai, the inclusion of civil society did not, on its own, make for a participatory reform process. Similar concerns were voiced with regard to public consultations on constitutional provisions, to which Tarai citizens were at times denied entry on the premise that these meetings "were open only to party cadres" (International Crisis Group 2016: 13).
As a result, voices from the Tarai were grossly under-represented in decision-making on the institutional reform process, and this under-representation directly affected decisions to protest against the proposed reforms. As Ghale (2015) 
Modalities: Embedding, Rhetoric, Backtracking, and Acceleration
The link between the politics of institutional reform and the recent violence in Nepal includes several further notions apart from elite control of decision-making that are theoretically distinct from the concept of actors, though at times difficult to fully separate empirically. One of the key problems with the finalisation of the constitution was that the demarcation of federal provinces coincided with and was embedded in a number of simultaneous reforms -listed above -which, in "concert" (Kurtenbach and Mehler 2013) , enhanced fear among the Tarai communities that they were being pushed even further to the margins. This notion links to the previous studies cited above and demonstrates that institutional reforms do not appear in a vacuum; they add up and impact, as a whole, the individuals' decisions to accept them or protest against them.
Notably, the reforms tackling Nepal's federal structure coincided with a revision of the citizenship law. Historically, citizenship in Nepal has been based on patrilineal kinship, and stipulates that children of a Nepalese father and a foreign mother are entitled to citizenship by descent, but children of a Nepalese mother and a foreign father can only obtain naturalised citizenship. This not only reveals an extremely patriarchal attitude towards citizenship but is also seen as highly discriminatory against Madhesis, who frequently inter-marry with families on the other side of the Nepal-India border (Democracy Resource Center Nepal 2015).
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Protestors voiced concerns about how the proposed reforms added up to increase their discrimination, tweeting, for instance, "A constitution that shames me as a woman, a citizen, In addition to highlighting the select actors mandated with decision-making over institutional reforms and how these actors embedded single reforms in a wider process, the case of Nepal demonstrates how the modalities of the institutional reform process have contributed to the violent escalation of community grievances. Firstly, activists in the Tarai perceived the process as rushed, which heightened fears that the opinions of those other than the traditional elites would be disregarded (Watson 2016) . After the largest parties signed the 16-point agreement in June 2015, they referred to what would follow as a "super-fast track" process (Thapa 2015) , "to indicate that they adopted the shortest possible process to promulgate the constitution" (Democracy Resource Center Nepal 2015). While a partial explanation for this rushed decision-making was the stress that political elites were under following the earthquakes, Madhesis and Tharus who had not been invited to join the discussions felt "steamrollered" by the acceleration of reforms (International Crisis Group 2016: 7). The abovementioned and already flawed public consultation mechanisms were also believed to have become irrelevant as they were shortened to last "a mere two days" (Ghale 2015) . CA members equally argued that they "were not given enough time to read the draft" and that discussions of the draft were at times completely eliminated before a vote took place (International Crisis Finally, the protestors' anger has been stirred by elites' backtracking on past commitments with regard to institutional reforms, which has contributed to the profound lack of trust that Tarai minorities voice towards their political representatives at the centre. I noted above how the reversal of PR provisions in the reformed electoral system is regarded as a major political loss by the Tarai communities. In particular, however, the communities also 
